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Macdonald: Review Essay—Classical Masters

REVIEW ESSAYS

CLASSICAL MASTERS

Douglas J. Macdonald

Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic
Thought. New York: Frank Cass, 2001. 482pp. $57.50

Michael I. Handel, Philip A. Crowl Professor of Comparative Strategy and a
member of the faculty of the Strategy and Policy Department, Naval War College, passed away in June 2001. An internationally recognized expert on, and interpreter of, the thought of the German philosopher of war Karl von Clausewitz,
Handel also wrote on subjects ranging from Israeli politics to the role and behavior of weak powers in the international system. Published widely as a noted
expert on intelligence and its role in decision making, he also was a practitioner
of the art: he consulted with the U.S. military in planning the use of deception
against Iraq in the 1991 DESERT STORM war. His role in that war undoubtedly
saved allied lives.
Despite his many other practical and scholarly accomplishments, it was as an
analyst of the military classics that Handel is most highly regarded. His third,
revised and expanded, edition of Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought
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Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 2, Art. 7
92

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

cultural, or regional.” In this, he largely succeeds. Handel argues compellingly
that, despite the variations of time, culture, and space, the underlying logic of
the situation facing any military planner is essentially similar in many respects.
Thus he suggests, for example, that Clausewitz and Sun Tzu should be read as
complementary rather than opposing texts, although they wrote some two
millennia apart. This synthetic approach consistently bears fruit as one proceeds
through the text. Handel was one of the few scholars with the intellectual and
historical erudition to carry this ambitious goal off successfully.
In Handel’s analysis, naturally enough, Clausewitz leads the way. The treatment of this crucial body of work is creative and forceful, never hesitant to
interpret boldly, and this third edition of Masters of War has considerably
more varied citations than earlier versions. In such a comprehensive treatment, readers are sure to choose some areas to praise over others. This reviewer
especially valued Handel’s sophisticated and nuanced treatment of Clausewitz’s
dialectical method, which sometimes is overlooked in other works. As Handel
makes clear, Clausewitz was a product of the German intellectual world, which
was experiencing one of the most creative periods in philosophy in a single
nation in modern times. When one thinks of nineteenth-century German intellectual life, one does not immediately recall literary figures or scientists but
philosophers—Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Marx. This
was a deeply philosophical society that saw itself as carrying out (in H. L. Mencken’s
memorable phrase) “most of the world’s painful thinking.” Within that context,
Clausewitz as philosopher of war could not have been untouched by the leading
philosophical currents of his time; indeed, these figured as prominently as the
practical example of the Napoleonic Wars in the formulation of On War. In this
respect, it is necessary to mention the influence of Hegel.
Although some scholars, such as Peter Paret, have found the links between
Hegel’s and Clausewitz’s systems of thought tenuous, the “ideal type” of method
of thought used by Clausewitz and analyzed by Handel owes much to the Hegelian method of thesis-antithesis-synthesis (see especially Handel’s discussion
in chapter 13 and appendix C). Somewhat curiously, Handel does not openly
acknowledge Hegel’s influence specifically in this regard. Perhaps he wanted to
keep controversy over intellectual “influence” out of the way in his analysis of
the universal value of Clausewitz’s thought, or to avoid having to introduce the
reader to the idiosyncratic and dense philosophical vocabulary that, at least in
translation, has made Hegel’s thought almost impenetrable to all but the most
dedicated reader. As good as Handel’s analysis is without this intellectual context, its inclusion might have allowed us to see Clausewitz not simply as a philosopher of war but as part of a broader philosophical movement that helped shape
his extraordinary work. As Paret has noted, one can make too much of the
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similarities of these intellectual currents, but they nonetheless exist. Handel’s
excellent analysis repeatedly, yet implicitly, demonstrates this point.
The “Master” in the title Masters of War, of course, is plural. Handel’s comparisons of the works of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are nothing short of brilliant.
In particular, the imagined answers that one writer might give to challenges
from the other are creatively presented in appendix C, where Masters of War
reaches its creative best.
Sun Tzu is one of the most influential military writers of all time, The Art of
War having been written some 2,400 years ago. Yet it had basically been overlooked by the English-speaking world until the 1960s, when interest in Mao
Zedong (formerly rendered “Mao Tse-tung”) and his theory of guerrilla warfare
led to a seminal translation by the late American Marine Corps general Samuel
B. Griffith III. It has always been enormously influential in Chinese military
thought; not only did Mao Zedong constantly refer to the work, but Jiang Jieshi
(formerly “Chiang Kai-shek”) reportedly had a rare collection of commentaries
on Sun Tzu going back centuries. Sun Tzu strongly influenced Japanese military
thinking, and Ho Chi Minh personally translated the work into Vietnamese for
training his officers and troops. It is not going too far to suggest that Sun Tzu is
to the Far East what Clausewitz is to the West.
Yet as Handel makes perfectly clear, The Art of War is far more than a cookbook for would-be revolutionaries or those who oppose them. It is a profound
work on the art of war itself, and its concentration on the moderating effects of
the practical and factual in war offers a fine complement—this is Handel’s word;
a more ardent critic of Clausewitz might say antidote—to Clausewitz’s tendencies, at times, toward abstractions and theorizing in the German philosophical
fashion. Here again, dealing with these two masters, Handel’s synthetic proclivities yield extremely creative theorizing. His analysis of “attacking the enemy’s
plans” (Sun Tzu) and the “center of gravity” of the enemy’s army (Clausewitz),
or, as Handel puts it felicitously, of “Eastern Psychology and Western Mechanics,” is brilliantly conceived, and clearly the best work on the subject that
this reviewer has ever seen. In this sense, Handel’s work itself is clearly creatively
synthetic. I finished the chapter wishing for much more such analysis from Handel, and deeply saddened that there will be no more.
Other classical masters, of course, are also included, ranging from Thucydides
to Machiavelli and Jomini, and there are briefer treatments of more recent
analysts. Only the choice and elevation of one “theorist” raised questions in this
reviewer’s mind—Mao Zedong. Mao’s military thought is highly derivative of
Sun Tzu’s; his principles for guerrilla fighters often borrowed from Sun word for
word. Although he claimed also to have studied Clausewitz, there is precious
little evidence that he did so in any systematic way. (Mao in fact once claimed to
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an American sympathizer to have been influenced by the military thought of
George Washington. But this was undoubtedly prompted by his desire to appeal
to Americans politically in the 1930s rather than to assert real intellectual influence.) There is no doubt that Mao deserves respect and study as a military “practitioner,” but I remain unconvinced that he is in the same category as Sun or
Clausewitz, or the others included here, as a military “theorist.”
These are minor quibbles on a major work of military and philosophical
analysis, and all of them can and should be challenged. This is what Masters of
War accomplishes admirably: it makes the reader think more deeply about
problems, and that is the fundamental purpose of scholarship. Michael Handel
has left us a comprehensive scholarly legacy of the first rank. Masters of War will
undoubtedly remain a cornerstone of that legacy, for the specialist or the student. He has also left us with the great gift of creative “painful thinking” on the
art of war that can only grow in importance in the troubled times ahead. As
Masters of War makes abundantly clear, the best of such thinking is timeless.
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